We model and analyze strategic interaction over time in a duopoly. Each period the …rms independently and simultaneously take two sequential decisions. First, they decide whether or not to advertise, then they set prices for goods which are imperfect substitutes.
Introduction
We study strategic interaction over time in a duopolistic market in which advertising causes di¤erent types of externalities in the time-dimension. For this purpose, we design a game with joint frequency dependent stage payo¤s which allows us to incorporate rather complex relationships, and analyze it with modi…cations of techniques traditionally used for in…nitely repeated games. Each period the agents are engaged in Bertrand competition in a strategic environment determined by their past advertising e¤orts and the current advertising decisions, both taken as known for the pricing decision. A strategy in this framework is a prescription, or 'game plan', for the entire in…nite time horizon consisting of advertising and pricing decisions for which the intertemporal e¤ects of advertising e¤orts should be considered.
Each period is split up in two decision moments. First, both …rms independently and simultaneously decide to advertise or not. Next, observing these decisions they set their prices. If a …rm decides to advertise, it pays a 'fee'at the beginning of the period for advertisement e¤orts during that period. Hence, for the Bertrand competition phase the advertisement costs can be regarded as sunk. We model this phase under the assumption that consumption in a given period does not depend on the periods before, as may very well be assumed for instance, for certain non-durable or perishable goods.
Advertising has two e¤ects separated in the time dimension, 1 it a¤ects immediate sales directly and future sales in a cumulative manner (cf., e.g., Friedman [1983] ) and we aim to capture both. With respect to the direct, i.e., immediate or short-run, e¤ects, advertising increases the own immediate sales given the action of the other …rm. Advertising may also cause immediate externalities. Friedman [1983] distinguishes predatory and cooperative advertising. An increase in advertising e¤orts of one …rm leads to a sales decrease of the other in the former type, to an increase in the second type of advertising. In our model we incorporated features to allow representation of both aspects concerning the short term e¤ects of advertising.
There is also an indirect, or cumulative, e¤ect of current advertisement on future sales. To capture this feature, we introduce the notion of sales potential varying in time under the decisions the …rms have taken concerning their past advertising e¤orts (see also Joosten [2009] ). The current sales potential of each …rm is determined by its own but also by its opponent's past e¤orts. A higher e¤ort of either …rm leads to an increase of the sales potentials (ceteris paribus), but the impact of the own past e¤orts on the own potential is always stronger than the impact of the opponent's past e¤orts. Advertising is therefore cooperative in its cumulative e¤ects on the sales potentials. 2 How much of these materialize as immediate sales, depends on the current advertisement decisions.
The shapes of the current demand functions are determined 'roughly'by past advertising, whereas present e¤orts …x the demand functions in detail. To be more speci…c, high past cumulative advertisement expenditures shift the sales potential curves upward, high individual past expenditure make the own demand less price elastic; asymmetric e¤orts lead to a tilt of the same curves, making the more active …rm less vulnerable to a price decrease of the less active one. Current demand functions are then …xed by the advertisement actions in the …rst decision moment of the stage and unless both …rms advertise a part of the potential is lost ceteris paribus.
In our dynamic deterministic duopolistic leaderless model of Bertrand competition for non-durable incomplete substitutes, we restrict ourselves to persuasive advertising with long and short run externalities on sales. 3 We assume that the …rms wish to maximize the average pro…ts over an in…nite time-horizon. We determine equilibria employing modi…cations of techniques traditionally used to analyze in…nitely repeated games. We …nd, as in the Folk Theorem for repeated games, that a continuum of rewards may exist which can be supported by an equilibrium involving 'threats'. Pareto e¢ ciency seems a very useful criterion to reduce the abundance of equilibria from this Folk Theorem, as for many parameter constellations, there exists a unique Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium.
The critical reader may wonder why one would desire an additional model given the a-uence of advertising models. A major forte of our approach is its generality as we only require continuity of the functions involved. Empirical research should provide us with appropriate classes of dynamics and in that sense we are ready to deal with almost anything that empirics will throw at us. Furthermore, most empirical research takes measurements at certain predetermined points in time. Since our methods deal with decisions, actions and changes in discrete time, a translation e¤ort into continuous time for instance is quite unnecessary. An additional advantage of our type of modeling is that it may serve as a vehicle of communication to large communities of economically inclined users who are not experts in the mathematical discipline of optimal control theory or dynamic programming, the dominant modes of analysis in di¤erential and di¤erence games. 4 In an additional 'introductory'section, we relate our model to others in the literature. Next, we proceed with a section to introduce the advertisement model. Section 4 deals with strategies and rewards; Section 5 treats threats and equilibria. Section 6 concludes.
Literature and the positioning of our model
As mentioned, the games to be considered are games with joint frequency dependent stage payo¤s, JFD-games for short, which generalize games with frequency dependent stage payo¤s, or FD-games, introduced by , fully classi…ed and analyzed in Joosten, Brenner & Witt [2003] . Such games can be classi…ed as stochastic games or di¤erence games but we are apprehensive to do so, because both classes of games are closely associated to modeling traditions which are quite technically advanced and involved. 5 JFD-games however, have the advantage that certain intertemporal externalities can be modeled conveniently. We gained experience investigating a range of problems in which current decisions in ‡uence payo¤s or other relevant options in the future. We challenge(d) the virtual monopoly of differential games in models on advertising (Joosten [2009] ), the exploitation of common (renewable) resource systems (Joosten [2007a (Joosten [ ,b,c,2010 ), environmental pollution (Joosten et al. [2003] , Joosten [2004] ), changing preferences (Joosten et al. [2003] ), and learning-by-doing (Joosten et al. [2003] ). Dorfman & Steiner [1954] examine the e¤ects of advertising in a static monopoly and derive necessary conditions for the optimal level of advertising. In a dynamic monopolistic model, Nerlove & Arrow [1962] treat advertisement expenditures similar to investments in a durable good. This durable good is called goodwill which is assumed to in ‡uence current sales. Historical investments in advertisement increase the stock of goodwill, but simultaneously goodwill depreciates over time. Nerlove and Arrow derive necessary conditions for optimal advertising, thus generalizing the Dorfman and Steiner result. Friedman [1983] in turn generalizes the Nerlove-Arrow model to allow oligopolistic competition in advertising and derives necessary conditions for the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium (Nash [1951] ).
Our notion of sales potential is quite close to goodwill in e.g., Nerlove & Arrow [1962] and Friedman [1983] . The modeling of the changes in time in the former model follows the work of Vidale & Wolfe [1957] , though the authors quote Waugh [1959] as a main source of inspiration. Vidale & Wolfe [1957] present an interesting …eld study giving empirical evidence of the positive e¤ects of past advertising on current sales. Furthermore, once advertising expenditures are stopped, current sales do not collapse, but slowly deteriorate over time. Though Friedman quotes the work of Nerlove and Arrow as a source for the notion of goodwill, his technical treatment of the changes of the level of goodwill in time is inspired by Prescott [1973] .
Economics has produced a large body of work on advertising. One source of variety is the modeling of time-related aspects. For instance, is the model static (e.g., Dorfman & Steiner [1954] ), or is it dynamic in the sense that the strategic environment may change (e.g., Nerlove & Arrow [1962] )? Another source of variety is the market under consideration, e.g., monopoly (Nerlove & Arrow [1962] ), oligopoly (Friedman [1983] ), leaderfollower oligopoly (Kydland [1977] ). A third one is possible combinations of advertising with other marketing instruments, e.g., Schmalensee [1978] combines advertising and quality. A fourth is the entity to be in ‡uenced by advertising, for instance sales (e.g., Nerlove & Arrow [1962] ) or market shares (e.g., Fershtman [1984] ). A …fth is the strategic dimension in which competition on the market is chosen, for instance Cournot (e.g., Joosten origin of di¤erence games is not known to this author, but an in ‡uential example is the model of Levhari & Mirman [1980] on common pool resource exploitation. Continuous time variants of di¤erence games are di¤erential games (see e.g., Dockner et al. [2000] , Jørgensen & Zaccour [2004] , Engwerda [2005] ).
[2009]) or Bertrand competition (e.g., Cellini et al. [2008] ).
Another dimension is based on the distinction by Nelson [1970] between search and experience goods. The characteristics of the former kind are known by-and-large before purchase, whereas those of the latter can be determined only after purchase. Advertising di¤ers for the two types of goods because the information conveyed to the consumers di¤ers. Informative advertising provides information on e.g., the price, availability or characteristics of a product; persuasive advertising tries to generate consumer interest for a product, often by association or through rather indirect 'channels'. An example of persuasive advertising would be a famous athlete shown drinking a certain beverage, or eating some kind of cereal. Credence goods (Darby & Karni [1973] ) can be regarded as an extreme type of experience good, as it is hard to determine their characteristics even after purchase. The quality of a certain brand of toothpaste can only be determined in the very long run after a visit to a dentist. Informative advertising is directed at search goods, persuasive advertising aims at experience or credence goods.
For dynamic optimal control models of advertisement Sethi [1977] performed a Herculean task by coming up with a classi…cation distinguishing four types. The task may prove to be Sisyphean, as a more recent survey by Feichtinger et al. [1994] already features six classes. Three new categories were introduced, categories present in the earlier classi…cation were renamed and expanded, and merely one category survived in its original form. The reader interested in di¤erential games on advertising is referred to Dockner et al. [2000] and Jørgensen & Zaccour [2004] .
The rules of the game
The advertisement game is played by two …rms (players) A and B at discrete moments in time called stages. Each stage the players independently and simultaneously take two decisions sequentially. First the …rms decide whether to advertise or not; then, the …rms set their prices knowing the advertisement decisions taken. The pricing decisions are assumed su¢ ciently independent that there are no forward or backward consumption externalities in the time dimension. We have two types of externality e¤ects from advertising, an immediate one and one which develops gradually in time. We start by describing the Bertrand competition at a given stage assuming past and current advertisement decisions to be known. Next, we treat immediate externalities from advertising in the same stage, then we formalize the externalities over time, and …nally connect these e¤ects.
A Bertrand stage game
We assume that at a given stage the two …rms have the following demand functions:
where k = A; B; and :k denotes 'not k'. So, for instance, …rm A's demand x A depends on the level of its own price p A , but also on p B ; the price set by the other …rm. We take all parameters in (1) to be positive. This means that the demand for …rm A goes down if A increases its price, but goes up if …rm B increases its price. This implies that the goods produced by both …rms can be regarded as substitutes. The price spill-over e¤ects captured by a 2k ; k = A; B; can not increase without bounds relative to the own price e¤ects a 1k ; k = A; B; in this model. A condition which su¢ ces for the ensuing analysis to make sense (technically speaking) is
It should be noted however, that we can make do with a much weaker condition which depends however, on the mutual spill-over e¤ects.
The agents wish to maximize their stage payo¤s using prices as strategic variables while facing linear costs, i.e., we have costs equal to
with c k > 0 and c 0;k 0 for k = A; B: Here, c 0;k denotes the …xed costs, and c k the constant marginal costs for …rm k:
The above means that the …rms face the following rather standard maximization problems in the framework of Bertrand competition:
For the sake of easy reference, we introduce a notation for the parameter sets de…ning the demand functions, i.e., (D; a) = (D A ; D B ; a 1A ; a 2A ; a 1B ; a 2B ): (1)- (4) is given by
The pro…t maximizing quantity sold for …rm k = A; B; is then given by Finally, we can write down the pro…ts for both players depending on the parameters of the demand functions.
We will now give a fairly standard numerical example to compare it with our expansions in the sequel.
Example 1 Let for k = A; B, the demand and the cost curves be given by
Here, x k denotes the demand for …rm k; given its own price p k and the price of its competitor p :k : These demand curves are illustrated in Figure 1 . From Eq. (5) we derive the following speci…cs for the reaction curves.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of these reaction curves. Lemma 1 yields the Bertrand equilibrium:
(p A ; p B ) = (7:8; 7:8) :
This can be conveniently con…rmed in Figure 2 , as the Bertrand equilibrium coincides with the intersection point of the reaction curves. The associated (pro…t maximizing) sales are then given by
The associated pro…t levels can be computed as being equal to A = B = 65:783: Figure 2: The reaction curves in the price dimension for Example 1. The intersection point is to be associated with a Bertrand equilibrium, i.e., prices are mutual best-replies.
Immediate e¤ects of advertising
Now, we assume that there is an immediate e¤ect of advertising on the demand functions of both …rms. We choose the following notations
where j k 2 f1; 2g denotes the action regarding advertising chosen by player k 2 fA; Bg in the same stage. So, there are four possible action combinations depending on the advertisement decisions of the agents at the beginning of the stage. We do not assume that the costs of production depend on the advertising decisions of the agents, however, advertisement costs are not assumed zero. Stated di¤erently, advertising decisions j A ; j B induce (D; a)
; a See Figure 3 for a graphic illustration of the timing issues involved.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that the shape of the demand curves does not change qualitatively. More speci…cally, the advertising decisions shift these curves up or down without changing their slope. Hence, to make sense in the present context we …nd the following speci…cations rather helpful. We assume that the relation between the various demand functions under the advertising decisions is such that
So, this will bring about the desired technical consequences with respect to the demand functions. We would like to highlight the following convenient property to be used in the remainder.
The lemma implies for the setting formulated the following.
Corollary 1 Under the assumption formulated in Equation (4), Lemma 2 implies
So, under all di¤erent speci…cations the Bertrand equilibrium prices are identical. Hence, the optimal quantities and pro…t levels can be determined easily. where, for instance,
Example 2 Advertising is not for free and it is assumed that the advertisement costs are …xed and equal for both …rms, i.e.,
We continue the example given before in the sense that we assume the demand functions if neither …rm advertises to be given by
With respect to the immediate e¤ects of advertising we assume that It can be con…rmed readily that for given price levels, total sales increase if advertising e¤orts in the industry increase, i.e., where we omit the notations for the price levels. Moreover, again ceteris paribus. Hence, own sales increase in own marketing e¤orts but also in the marketing e¤orts of the competitor. In this sense advertising in this example partially has a public good character (Fershtman [1984] ). In other words, there exists the following advertising externality: keeping one player's action …xed, advertising of his opponent increases the former's sales as well. There are however, di¤erences as to which …rm bene…ts with respect to sales more from advertising for 'asymmetric'advertising, i.e., This means that the …rm engaging in advertising has higher sales than the inactive …rm. Lemma 2 allows us to write down the associated payo¤ matrix easily as: 2 Note that the stage game has two pure Nash equilibria, namely top-right and bottom-left, hence in equilibrium precisely one …rm advertises. The …rm advertising appropriates a greater share of the sales increase, but bears all costs; the other …rm bene…ts moderately from its competitor's e¤orts absolutely for free. There is also a mixed Nash equilibrium in the stage game, Pareto dominated by both pure ones.
Long term e¤ects, sales potentials
Another type of externalities accumulates gradually over time. We assume that advertisement at any point in time has two e¤ects in the future. First, the advertisement e¤orts have a cumulative e¤ect on the way the total market increases and second, the …rm showing more cumulative advertisement e¤orts gets a larger share of this (potentially) expanded market. In order to introduce these externalities, we need several notations. Let h A t 0 = j A 1 ; :::; j A t 0 1 be the sequence of actions 6 chosen by player A until stage t 0 2 and let h B t 0 be de…ned similarly for the other player. Let m n denote the set of real-numbered non-negative m n-matrices such that all components add up to unity, i.e., Let matrix U (i 0 ; j 0 ) 2 2 2 be de…ned by: Then, let q 0, and de…ne matrix t 2 2 2 recursively for t t 0 by 1 = e 2 2 2 ; and
Taking q 0 moderates 'early' e¤ects on the stage payo¤s. Recall that j A t 1 denotes the action chosen by A at stage t 1. The interpretation of this matrix is that entry ij of t 'approximates'the relative frequency with which action pair (i; j) was used before stage t 2; as it can be shown that
Here, U h A t ; h B t = 1 t 1 P t k=2 U j A k 1 ; j B k 1 for all t 2: Clearly, the in ‡u-ence of e and q disappears in the long run.
At stage t 2 N, the players have chosen action sequences h A t and h B t inducing the matrix t : The latter determines the state in which the play is at stage t: 7 Observe that there exist four possible successor states to any 7 Slightly more formal, we will denote the state at stage t 2 N by t from now on.
state depending on the action pair chosen at stage t: Figure 4 visualizes the externalities resulting from the di¤erent histories possible. We assume that some of the parameters used in the previous subsection to formalize the demand functions are indeed given for the maximization problem at hand, i.e., at that stage, but vary over time depending on the advertising behaviors of both …rms in the past, i.e., before that stage, in the following manner
So, given t ; the sales potentials 8 at stage t are given by
where all the functions concerned are continuous functions from 2 2 to R. The sales potential of a …rm at a certain stage is in ‡uenced by the …rm's own advertisement e¤orts before, but also by the other player's past advertisement e¤orts. Own past e¤orts are always positive ceteris paribus, i.e., the sales potential is always higher if the own advertisement e¤orts have been higher in the past. Also, the own past e¤orts have a stronger impact on the …rm's sales potential than the other …rm's have. This can be formalized into the following set of restrictions: 
0:
We do not place stronger restrictions on the functions concerned in order to guarantee the highest degree of generality. Sales potentials materialize as demand whenever both …rms advertise at the start of the stage game. Otherwise, some potential will evaporate. We now show how the above can be incorporated into an attractive model. Advertising does not only have an impact on the demand functions in the sense that they move shift upward or downward. The parameters indicating the slopes of the demand function in the own price (a 1k ) and the other price (a 2k ) may change as well, hence the associated functions tilt. Note that more intense own past advertisement e¤orts have been, the less the own demand drops in case of an own price increase; the own demand su¤ers from increased past advertisement e¤orts by the other …rm.
Having explained how the sales potentials depend on past advertising behavior, we now link the sales potentials and the actual sales in the stage game. First, the sales potentials are given by Eq. (5):
Each of the functions is speci…ed above. The actual sales materializing from the sales potentials depend on the current advertisement decisions as follows Hence, the total stage game sales are realized if both agents do advertise in the stage game, otherwise some potential is lost, up to half evaporates in case nobody advertises. By Lemma 2 we have the same Bertrand prices in all four cases, and the associated demands are simple multiples as follows:
Please observe that the numerical examples treated in the preceding subsections can be recovered as a special case by setting [ t ] 22 = 1:
Strategies and rewards
At stage t, both players know the current state and the history of play, i.e., the state visited and actions chosen at stage u < t denoted by u ; j A u ; j B u :
A strategy prescribes at all stages, for any state and history, a mixed action to be used by a player. The sets of all strategies for A respectively B will be denoted by X A respectively X B ; and X X A X B : The payo¤ to player k; k = A; B; at stage t; is stochastic and depends on the strategy-pair ( ; ) 2 X ; the expected stage payo¤ is denoted by R k t ( ; ) : In Figure  4 we have visualized the fact that the strategy determines the advertisement decisions in the respective stages and that externalities are caused by these decisions along the play.
The players receive an in…nite stream of stage payo¤s during the play, and they are assumed to wish to maximize their average rewards. For a given pair of strategies ( ; ) ; player k's average reward, k = A; B; is given by
. It may be quite hard to determine the set of feasible (average) rewards F , directly. It is not uncommon in the analysis of repeated or stochastic games to limit the scope of strategies on the one hand, and to focus on rewards on the other. Here, we will do both, we focus on rewards from strategies which are pure and jointly convergent. Then, we extend our analysis to obtain more feasible rewards.
A strategy is pure, if at each stage a pure action is chosen, i.e., the action is chosen with probability 1: The set of pure strategies for player k is P k , and P P A P B : The strategy pair ( ; ) 2 X is jointly convergent if and only if z ; 2 m n exists such that for all " > 0 :
where Pr ; denotes the probability under strategy-pair ( ; ). J C denotes the set of jointly-convergent strategy pairs. Under a pair of jointlyconvergent strategies, the relative frequency of each action pair (i; j) 2 J converges with probability 1 to z ; ij in the terminology of Billingsley [1986, p.274] , i.e., this implies lim t!1 E ; fU h A t ; h B t g = z ; : However, this implies also lim t!1 E ; f t g = z ; :
The set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards is given by
where cl S is the closure of the set S: For any pair of rewards in this set, we can …nd a pair of jointly-convergent pure strategies that yield rewards arbitrarily close to the original pair of rewards.
The following result, illustrated in Figure 5 , can be found in Joosten et al. [2003] for FD-games. Related ideas were designed for the analysis of repeated games with vanishing actions (cf., Joosten, Peters & Thuijsman [1995] , Joosten [1996 Joosten [ , 2005 , Schoenmakers et al. [2002] , Schoenmakers [2004] ). Let CP J C denote the convex hull of P J C :
Theorem 3 For any FD-game, we have P J C = S z2 m n '(z): Moreover, each pair of rewards in CP J C is feasible. Figure 5: The set of jointly-convergent pure strategy rewards resembles a spearhead. The …gure contains holes but the real set is dense. The Paretoe¢ cient equilibrium coincides with both …rms always advertising .
From the formulation of Theorem 3 it may not be apparent, but an implication is that P J C can be visualized rather elegantly. For this purpose, several algorithms have been designed, involving the computation of a pair of feasible rewards for a signi…cant number of 'frequency-matrices' z 2 m n .
Equilibria
The strategy pair ( ; ) is an equilibrium, if no player can improve by unilateral deviation, i.e., A ( ; ) A ( ; ) ; B ( ; ) B ( ; ) for all 2 X A ; 2 X B : An equilibrium is called subgame perfect if for each possible state and possible history (even unreached states and histories) the subsequent play corresponds to an equilibrium, i.e., no player can improve by deviating unilaterally from then on.
In the construction of equilibria for repeated games, 'threats' play an important role. A threat speci…es the conditions under which one player will punish the other, as well as the subsequent measures. We call v = v A ; v B the threat point, where v A = min 2X B max 2X A A ( ; ); and v B = min 2X A max 2X B B ( ; ): So, v A is the highest amount A can get if B tries to minimize his average payo¤s. Under a pair of individually rational rewards each player receives at least his threat-point reward.
To present the general idea of the result of Joosten et al. [2003] to come, we adopt terms from Hart [1985] , Forges [1986] and Aumann & Maschler [1995] . First, there is a 'master plan'which is followed by each player as long as the other does too; then there are 'punishments'which come into e¤ect if a deviation from the master plan occurs. The master plan is a sequence of 'intra-play communications'between the players, the purpose of which is to decide by which equilibrium the play is to continue. The outcome of the communication period is determined by a 'jointly controlled lottery', i.e., at each stage of the communication period the players randomize with equal probability on both actions; at the end of the communication period one sequence of pairs of action choices materializes.
Detection of deviation from the master plan after the communication period is easy as both players use pure actions on the equilibrium path from then on. Deviation during the communication period by using an alternative randomization on the actions is impossible to detect. However, it can be shown that no alternative unilateral randomization yields a higher reward. So, the outcome of the procedure is an equilibrium. For more details, we refer to Joosten et al. [2003] . We restate here the major result which applies to general games with frequency-dependent stage payo¤s as well as to JFDgames.
Theorem 4 (Joosten, Brenner & Witt [2003] ) Each pair of rewards in the convex hull of all individually-rational pure-strategy rewards can be supported by an equilibrium. Moreover, each pair of rewards in the convex hull of all pure-strategy rewards giving each player strictly more than the threat-point reward, can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The following is visualized in Figure 6 and illustrated in Example 4.
Corollary 5 Let E 0 = f(x; y) 2 P J C j (x; y) vg be the set of all individually rational jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards. Then, each pair of rewards in the convex hull of E 0 can be supported by an equilibrium. Moreover, all rewards in E 0 giving A strictly more than v A and B strictly more than v B can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In determining the set of jointly convergent pure strategy rewards and the sets depending on it, we took Bertrand equilibrium pricing as behavior for the stage game. To execute a 'threat'this need no longer hold, i.e., a player may very well punish using a low price at each stage in addition to a long term advertisement strategy in order to minimize his opponent's rewards. The following may serve as an example.
Example 4 It is quite di¢ cult to …nd a threat point in general. Instead, we will establish an upper bound for the threat point rewards. This implies that all rewards above this upper bound can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium. We assume that …rm A is to be punished by …rm B and …rm B simply sets a price and takes a long term advertising decision. Let therefore, p B = 4:95 and 11 = 21 = 0; then the long-run average pro…t of …rm A is The long-run frequency of the …rst event is 12 ; the frequency of the second one is 22 = 1 12 : Note that in the …rst event the costs are 200 higher because the agent has to pay for the advertising e¤orts. Multiplying the events' pro…ts with their relative frequencies, yields the average long run pro…ts. Note that if …rm A wishes to maximize the long-run average pro…ts, it may use both strategic variables 12 ; p A : We determine therefore the …rst derivatives of the long-run average pro…t function. This in turn implies that all rewards yielding more than 734:96 for both …rms can be supported by an equilibrium (a subgame perfect equilibrium) using threats (see Figure 6 for an illustration).
Figure 6: All rewards in P J C located to the 'north-east'of the two red lines can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Conclusion
We have formulated a new dynamic model of advertising in very general terms. A broad variety of long and short term externalities can be modeled by altering parameters. Long run advertising changes the height and shape of each …rm's sales potential (function) in a rather gradual fashion. From the sales potentials, the current demands are derived and the latter depend on the current advertising decisions. If both …rms advertise at that stage, then their potentials will become their immediate demands, otherwise some potential is lost and will not materialize in current demand. Our analysis has considerable similarities with methods standard in the study of repeated games. We regard this a major strength of the approach, large sets of equilibria are relatively easily found and the variety of mathematical equations allowed is almost limitless as we only need a weak continuity assumption to validate them. Admittedly, a slight drawback of the approach is the familiar one connected to Folk Theorems, namely that there are far too many equilibria. 9 For this purpose, additional selection criteria, such as Pareto-e¢ ciency 10 , might prove very useful. Equilibrium selection is however, not a theme of this paper.
We have analyzed one example of the model rather completely. Questions may arise about the robustness of this example with respect to alternative speci…cations. We have performed sensitivity analysis on all parameters. The qualitative features of the set of jointly convergent pure strategy rewards, so important for our analysis, are remarkably una¤ected by even rather large changes. For one-parameter changes we mostly observed shifts and expansions of the basic 'spearhead', but the shape of P J C remained essentially the same. We did not perform a complete sensitivity analysis on combinations of parameters, which is an arduous task.
The parameter with the most dramatic e¤ects turned out to be the advertisement fee. For high values, only one equilibrium exists namely never to advertise at all. For low advertisement costs, the unique Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium is to advertise always, and a continuum of equilibria exists which are not Pareto e¢ cient. For intermediate costs, a continuum of equilibria exists and a continuum of Pareto e¢ cient equilibria exists. The latter range of costs is extremely small relatively speaking.
An illustration of a case where the advertisement costs are considerably above the value used throughout this paper is given in Figure 7 . In the tail of the …sh shape, those rewards are to be found which result from strategies which do not yield enough long-run externalities for the sales potentials to expand su¢ ciently to justify incurring the advertisement fees. We have established an upper bound for the threat point of approximately zero, hence each reward in the positive orthant can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium. Note that this implies that although the shape of P J C changes considerably, the shape of the set of equilibria is not fundamentally di¤erent from its shape for lower values of the advertisement fees.
In addition to a certain degree of robustness regarding parameters, we may also report a robustness as to the speci…cations of the market in the stage games. In Joosten [2009] , we investigated long term advertising with numbers plausible from an assumption of Cournot competition. Further research must bring a more complete picture as to what to expect under di¤erent assumptions regarding competition in the stage games.
We have made concessions to reality to obtain results. We modeled advertising as an either-or decision, not taking into account that various 9 Opinions in the profession vary widely and wildly. Gintis [2001] for instance, dismisses Folk Theorems as 'anything goes results'. On the other hand, Osborne & Rubinstein [1994] point out that Folk Theorems may yield considerable Pareto improvements compared to in…netely repeated one-shot Nash equilibria.
1 0 Alternative selection criteria are advocated in e.g.,. Schelling [1960] , Sugden [1995] , Janssen [1998, 2001] ) or Güth et al. [1992] . Figure 7: For increasing advertisement costs, P J C changes gradually into a …sh shape. Here, the advertisement costs are equal to 1500.
budgets might be attributed to it. However, our model is easily generalized as any one-period budget in a …nite range with a smallest monetary unit can be modeled as a separate action. We refrained from doing so as the added notational burdens seem hardly justi…ed by additional insights. Vidale & Wolfe [1957] described the interaction of advertising and sales using a simple di¤erential equation in terms of three parameters, the sales decay constant, the saturation level, and the response constant. Some of the phenomena these parameters are meant to capture, are present in our model, albeit implicitly. Further research must reveal whether such empirical …ndings can be approximated to a higher degree. The building blocks of our model are easily adapted to accommodate input from empirics.
The class of (J)FD-games is rather new and the tools for analysis are far from complete. Some results beyond the framework of this paper have been established for environmental problems (Joosten [2004] ) and so-called Small Fish Wars (Joosten [2007a (Joosten [ ,b,c, 2010 , Joosten & Meijboom [2010] ). Extending the model to allow an n-…rm advertisement game is high on the agenda. 11 Large parts of the approach, most importantly Theorem 4, seem generalizable, but a comprehensive formal generalization is still pending.
A crucial step in our approach is …nding all jointly-convergent purestrategy rewards, another one is determining the threat point. For the …rst step continuity of the functions determining the average payo¤s on the relevant domains of the stochastic variables involved, su¢ ces. Unfortunately, there exists no general theory on (…nding) threat points in FD-games, yet.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let (D; a) be given and to economize on notations, we omit references to (D; a) as long as it seems harmless to do so. The maximization problems formulated in (4) yield the following …rst-order condition for a supremum :
The second-order conditions for a supremum are therefore easily ful…lled as 2a 1k < 0 for k = A; B:
From the …rst-order conditions we derive the following reaction curves (omitting references to the parameters):
Then, using the idea that a Bertrand equilibrium involves price strategies which mutual best replies, we may state that the solution obeys the …xed point criterion p A = p A (p B (p A )) yielding (D; a) ; the statement of the lemma follows immediately.
